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Only in the stream of thought and life do words have meaning.
Wittgenstein1
The belief in karma and rebirth, according to which actions performed in one lifetime 
bear fruit in a subsequent one, is widespread, some version of it being common 
among Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh, Jain, and some other religious traditions.  Ethnographic 
studies sometimes provide examples of how this belief manifests in people’s lives. 
For instance, fieldwork carried out by Richard and Candy Shweder in the eastern 
Indian town of Bhubaneswar yielded interview footage exhibiting how members of 
the Hindu community apply the concepts of karma and rebirth in describing their 
situations. A poignant case is that of an eighty-three-year-old high-caste brahmin 
woman who, over the preceding five years, had lost her husband, her eyesight, and 
her eldest daughter. During the interview, she remorsefully characterizes these oc-
currences as consequences of her own sinfulness:
“I was born a woman. I gave birth to a daughter. My daughter died. My husband died 
before I did. Suddenly my vision disappeared. Now I am a widow — and blind.” She 
weeps: “I cannot say which sin I have committed in which life, but I am suffering now 
because I have done something wrong in one of my births. All the sins are gathered near 
me.” (Shweder 1991, p. 159)
Other sources of examples include autobiographies and memoirs. In the memoir of 
Ani Pachen, a Tibetan warrior-nun who led an insurrection against the Chinese inva-
sion of Tibet, the author recounts how, when being tortured in a Chinese-run prison, 
she would attribute her suffering to her former misdeeds. In one instance, after recall-
ing how she was brutally lashed with wet bamboo canes, Pachen writes: “My ears 
were beginning to ring, and my face was burning. My previous karma, I thought. The 
pain will eliminate my sins” (Pachen 2001, p. 217).
What are non-believers in karma and rebirth to make of this way of conceiving 
of events, of the idea that one’s present circumstances are a result of sinful behavior 
in a previous life? Many philosophers, including some influenced by the later work 
of Wittgenstein, would say that there is something confused about a belief in reincar-
nation or rebirth. It is confused because it requires a dualistic conception of human 
beings, according to which we comprise two distinct metaphysical components, a 
body and a mind or soul, with the latter being capable of existing on its own and of 
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“transmigrating” to a new body when the old one dies. “Since time immemorial,” 
writes Peter Hacker, “human beings have fantasized about metempsychosis, the 
transmigration of souls.” Akin to these fantasies, Hacker suggests, are the thought 
experiments of philosophers who imagine, for example, a “prince awakening ‘in the 
body’ of a cobbler, having retained all his memories,” or the more fleshed-out but 
nonetheless fantastical scenarios depicted by fiction writers, envisaging such things 
as a man waking up to discover that his familiar human body has been replaced by 
that of a giant beetle. “Amusing or terrifying as these fictions are,” continues Hacker, 
“it is doubtful whether they make any sense.” Although they may exhibit an enig-
matic charm, the mere fact that we can imagine them does not show them to be 
logically possible (Hacker 2007, p. 301).
But is it right to characterize traditional beliefs in rebirth as fantasies, lumping 
them in the same category as rudimentarily sketched philosophical thought experi-
ments and more extravagantly imaginative fictional narratives? Other philosophers 
influenced by Wittgenstein would contend that such derogatory characterizations are 
premature if one has not yet given careful attention to the culturally informed con-
texts, the forms of life, within which the beliefs have their place. From this perspec-
tive, the philosopher’s task is not to try to convince herself or anyone else of the truth 
or falsity of the belief in question, but to investigate its sense by examining its “sur-
roundings,” namely the modes of language and activity with which expressions of 
the belief are implicated.2 Such an approach does not preclude the possibility that 
the belief may, in the end, be deemed obscure or incoherent, but it precludes any 
such judgment in advance of a conceptual, “grammatical,” investigation.3
My purpose in this essay is to explore how some key concepts from Wittgen-
stein’s later work can benefit our understanding of beliefs in karma and rebirth. I 
shall begin by elucidating the crucial theme of “bring[ing] words back from their 
metaphysical to their everyday use” (Wittgenstein [1953] 2009, sec. 116), for if the 
distinction between “metaphysical” and “everyday” is misunderstood, then the task 
of investigating religious concepts will be torpedoed at the outset. A consideration of 
how certain Wittgenstein-influenced philosophers have sought to bring the concept 
of the soul back to its everyday spiritual and ethical use will introduce the Wittgen-
steinian notion of a “picture” (either visual or verbal) whose meaning requires more 
than a mere superficial glance to discern. This will open the way to a discussion of 
attempts to “demythologize” the concepts of karma and rebirth in the study of reli-
gions, especially among scholars and indeed practitioners of Buddhism, for these 
attempts bear a certain resemblance to Wittgensteinian methods. While acknowledg-
ing that these “demythologizing” or “psychologizing” interpretations offer inventive 
reconstructions of the beliefs concerned, I shall argue that they fail to account for a 
central feature of these beliefs as they are evinced in examples such as those of Ani 
Pachen and the Hindu widow cited above.
Religious Forms of Language and “Everyday Use”
Philosophers influenced by Wittgenstein have been reasonably united in maintaining 
that his later work offers a damning critique of the dualistic picture of human beings 
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most paradigmatically associated with René Descartes.4 They differ considerably, 
however, in their views of what the implications of this critique are for religious con-
ceptions of the soul. On the one side are those who draw the conclusion that reli-
gious talk of the soul as something that can separate from the body is confused and 
must be abandoned. Hacker, for example, considers “religious doctrine and prom-
ises of an afterlife” to be among the pernicious influences that have “exacerbated” 
confusion over concepts such as those of mind and soul (2007, p. 289). On the other 
side are those who, while admitting that certain philosophical misrepresentations 
of religious modes of thought and language need to be abandoned, nevertheless 
maintain that, correctly understood, religious soul-talk is not confused. Philosophers 
in this latter camp typically strive to recover the ethical and spiritual significance of 
religious forms of language while avoiding the suggestion that terms such as “soul” 
refer to a mysterious immaterial substance that somehow causally interacts with the 
material body.
The contrast between these two ways of inheriting Wittgenstein’s approach and 
of comprehending its implications for our understanding of religion can be captured 
in relation to Wittgenstein’s well-known affirmation that “What we do is to bring 
words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use” ([1953] 2009, sec. 116). 
For those who take Wittgenstein’s methods to show that religious modes of language 
are (at least in many instances) confused, the “everyday use” of words does not in-
clude their religious uses; the latter are, for the most part, to be categorized with the 
metaphysical uses. Meanwhile, for those who take Wittgenstein’s methods to facili-
tate not a rejection but an elucidation of religious uses of language, those religious 
uses are held to be included within the category of the everyday: everyday uses of 
language are not all of one type, and among the multiple types is the religious, with 
its own idiosyncrasies and sub-varieties.
One source of difficulty for deciding which of these two interpretations is most 
closely aligned with Wittgenstein’s own approach is the fact that “metaphysical” is 
itself a term with various uses, and hence it may not be obvious what, in Wittgen-
stein’s remark, is being contrasted with “everyday use.” Terms such as “metaphysics” 
and “metaphysical” are patently not the exclusive preserve of academic philoso-
phers; they also have a life within other modes of discourse. Scholars and students of 
literature discuss the “metaphysical poets,” anthropologists and literary critics as well 
as philosophers speak of “metaphysical world views,” and phrases beginning with 
“the metaphysics of . . .” crop up in many domains.5 Traditionally, among the central 
objects of metaphysical inquiry in philosophy have been God, the soul, and the free-
dom of the will;6 hence, unsurprisingly, the concepts of theology, religion, and meta-
physics have been closely intertwined. Belief in God or the immortality of the soul is 
commonly characterized as a “metaphysical belief” or a belief in a “metaphysical 
entity.”7 And when the logical positivists devised arguments for the nonsensicality of 
metaphysical discourse, they typically assumed that religious discourse would be 
jettisoned too.8 So it is hardly surprising that many of those who understand Wittgen-
stein’s methods to involve a rejection of metaphysics assume them also to involve a 
rejection of religion, or at least a rejection of much of what religious believers have 
traditionally had to say.
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But when Wittgenstein speaks of “bring[ing] words back from their metaphysi-
cal to their everyday use,” by “metaphysical” he means the particular practice of 
“try[ing] to grasp the essence” of something without pausing to consider whether 
the terms that apply to that thing are, “in the language in which [they are] at home,” 
ever used in the way one is assuming ([1953] 2009, sec. 116). In short, to use a 
word in a metaphysical way — in the sense of “metaphysical” that is most pertinent 
to Wittgenstein’s purpose — is to use it in a way that detaches it from its practical 
and linguistic surroundings in the “hurly-burly” of life.9 Thus, it does not follow that 
religious uses are to be lumped in with metaphysical ones (in this sense of “meta-
physical”), for religious activities and uses of language are part of the hurly-burly 
of life. The crucial methodological point is that if those religious uses of language 
are to be understood by the philosopher, they must be considered in relation to 
their specifically religious contexts and not abstracted from those contexts or as-
sumed to be identical to the uses of homonymous or similar terms within non- 
religious contexts. They must, in other words, be brought back to their everyday 
religious use.
Pictures of the Soul
Attempts to return words such as “soul” and “spirit” from their metaphysical to their 
everyday religious uses have been made by Wittgenstein-influenced philosophers 
such as D. Z. Phillips and İlham Dilman.10 The work of both of these philosophers in 
this area relies heavily on Wittgenstein’s idea of a “picture.” By this is meant a mode 
of expression such as a visual image or form of words that does indeed express some-
thing, and cannot be replaced or paraphrased without some loss of meaning, and yet 
is in a certain way figurative: if understood in too crude a manner it could be highly 
misleading. Thus, Wittgenstein writes:
What do I believe in when I believe that man has a soul? What do I believe in when I 
believe that this substance contains two carbon rings? In both cases, there is a picture in 
the foreground, but the sense lies far in the background; that is, the application of the 
picture is not easy to survey. ([1953] 2009, sec. 422)
Picturing a substance as containing two carbon rings would be misleading if one as-
sumed the “rings” to be just like wedding rings or little hoops; the mistake would be 
in overlooking the fact that “ring” has a particular use in organic chemistry that is 
different from its use in other contexts. Similarly, one has to be careful with the idea 
that people have souls. To assume that this sense of “having” is equivalent to that in 
which someone has (possesses) a material item such as a fountain pen or a bicycle 
would be misleading, and to assume that the soul is in the body in the same sense as 
a coin is in my pocket, or my brain is in my skull, is liable to be a distortion of the 
religious sense of this idea.
“Religion teaches us that the soul can exist when the body has disintegrated,” 
writes Wittgenstein.
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Now do I understand what it teaches? — Of course I understand it — I can imagine various 
things in connection with it. After all, pictures of these things have even been painted. 
And why should such a picture be only an imperfect rendering of the idea expressed? 
Why should it not do the same service as the spoken doctrine? And it is the service that 
counts. ([1953] 2009, pt. 2, iv, sec. 23)
The thought here is that a visual depiction, such as a painting, can express an idea, 
and may be the best or even the only means of expressing precisely that idea, without 
its being the case that the painting merely represents a scene that “in real life” (as one 
might say) would be readily available to our senses. Wittgenstein makes roughly the 
same point in one of his lectures on religious belief (1966, p. 63), in which he re-
marks of Michelangelo’s painting of the creation of Adam that it may be an excellent 
depiction of the creation — it may be as good as it gets — and yet there would be no 
sense in asking whether God or Adam really looked like that (as one might ask of a 
portrait of one’s great grandmother, for example). And none of this should be as-
sumed to mean that the painting is “merely figurative,” as though there were some 
other kind of painting that would count as a literal depiction. One could describe it 
as figurative, provided this is not taken to imply that the painting does not show what 
is really meant.11 The same point applies to religious forms of language.
Christian ideas of one’s immortal soul being saved or damned may exemplify the 
point. Talk of falling “into the hands of God” or, alternatively, “into the pit of hell” 
presents pictures that may optimally express the ideas concerned. A believer may 
even say that they are pictures of what will happen. Yet it would not follow that they 
depict “what will happen” in the same sense as, say, a weather forecaster’s diagram 
does. The use of the pictures is different, and the use is the vital thing. The trouble 
with much of what goes by the name of philosophy of religion, Phillips complains, is 
that it rarely pays attention to how expressions concerning the soul are used: “We are 
offered talk of immaterial substances, disembodied spirits, and so on. . . . The resul-
tant analyses are a dislocation of the religious expressions” (Phillips 1995, p. 452).
Dilman seeks to retrieve the ethical and spiritual significance of soul-talk in his 
interpretation of Plato’s Phaedo. He construes Socrates’ talk of “the body as a tomb 
or a cage of the soul, and of death as its release” as instances of “thinking of the way 
appetites of the body, lust, gluttony, and the like, impede a different kind of life: 
spiritual life, a life of aspiration to certain ideals” (Dilman 1992, p. 79). The image 
that Plato presents of “the soul’s temporal existence as a journey through cycles of 
reincarnation” is, on Dilman’s reading, “a religious picture . . . [that] represents a 
way of thinking about life, a way of sizing up our actions within life’s brief span” 
(p. 6). Phillips is less sympathetic than Dilman to the imagery of reincarnation in the 
Phaedo. “The dialogue is an uneven one,” he opines, “and in many places Plato does 
speak as though by the soul he referred to a separate and independent element. This 
is particularly true when Plato speaks of the transmigration of souls” (Phillips 1970, 
p. 46).
Many interpreters of Plato would draw a distinction between a “literal” reading 
and a “figurative” or “symbolic” one,12 and would place Dilman’s firmly in the latter 
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category. From a Wittgensteinian perspective, there is no difficulty in acknowledging 
that talk of separating from the body and undergoing successive reincarnations con-
jures up images with ethical and spiritual resonance; one may also acknowledge that 
this way of speaking and the images it evokes are, in a certain sense, figurative. 
Again, however, this would not imply that they are not really what one means (and 
that what one really means could best be expressed in a non-figurative paraphrase). 
The difficulty comes when one assumes the literal-figurative distinction to be a dis-
tinction between two equally intelligible ways of understanding the picture, the only 
interpretive question to be resolved being that of which of them was intended by the 
author (Plato, in this case). For Phillips and Dilman the distinction is not of this kind, 
for they would concur with Hacker that the purportedly “literal” interpretation is 
merely a confusion; there is nothing that could really count as understanding the 
picture non-figuratively, because any attempt to render it in other terms crumbles 
into incoherence. Phillips, as we have seen, is willing to attribute some confusion 
to Plato’s text itself, whereas Dilman seeks a more thoroughgoing ethico-spiritual 
reading.
“Demythologizing” Karma and Rebirth
By analogy with Rudolf Bultmann’s approach to biblical hermeneutics, one might 
describe Dilman’s interpretation of Plato as an instance of “demythologizing.” Bult-
mann sought an interpretation of the New Testament that stripped away what he saw 
as extraneous and outdated mythological trappings in order to reveal its central mes-
sage more clearly, that message being an “existential” one that demands a decision 
about how to live. For Bultmann, the correct response to the message or “proclama-
tion” (kerygma) of the New Testament is “to live an eschatological existence,” in 
which God’s grace is understood to be operative here and now (Bultmann 1958, 
pp. 81–82). To respond in this way is to change one’s “attitude to the world” (Bult-
mann 1957, p. 153).13 One could say, invoking a phrase from Dilman that I quoted 
above, that it is to live “a different kind of life: spiritual life, a life of aspiration to 
certain  ideals.” Just as, on Dilman’s reading of Plato, the idea of reincarnation is a 
picture that governs the decisions one makes in one’s present life, so on Bultmann’s 
reading of the New Testament the eschaton is not to be conceived of as chronologi-
cally subsequent to this life; rather, “In every moment slumbers the possibility of 
being the eschatological moment. You must awaken it” (Bultmann 1957, p. 155).
The theme of “demythologization” has become pervasive in recent and con-
temporary interpretations of the doctrine of karma and rebirth in Buddhist and to a 
slightly lesser extent in Hindu traditions. Although such interpretations are rarely 
executed with explicit reference to Wittgenstein, a distinction comparable to that 
which Wittgenstein makes between the “picture in the foreground” (or “surface 
grammar”) and “the sense [that] lies far in the background” (or “depth grammar”) is 
frequently present.14 Offering a comprehensive survey of these demythologizing ap-
proaches exceeds the scope of this essay, but a selection of illustrative examples will 
be discussed.
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A common, although not universal, feature of demythologized construals of 
 karma and rebirth is the search for an essential doctrine that logically and histori-
cally precedes later embellishments or “accretions,” the “accretions” being seen as 
having been added by successive generations of redactors and commentators.15 
Writing around 1940, J. G. Jennings interprets “the original core” of the Buddha’s 
teaching to be a “doctrine of pure altruism or non-egoism, which has since been 
overlaid very naturally by one making a stronger appeal, namely the wonderful 
 Indian dogma of personal salvation through long purgation by transmigration in suc-
cessive lives” (1947, p. xxii).16 Noting that early Buddhist scriptures reject the idea of 
a stable “soul” or “self” (attā), Jennings argues that this rejection is incompatible with 
a doctrine that regards the actions of a given individual in one life as having repercus-
sions for that same individual in a future lifetime. Thus, rather than being understood 
as the rebirth of an individual self or person, the concept of rebirth should be under-
stood as applying to the recurrence of our selfish desires, which tend to repeat them-
selves unless we control and diminish them through the assiduous cultivation of 
selfless altruism.17 According to this interpretation, our actions do have conse quences 
beyond our present lives, but these consequences are “collective not individual” 
(p. xxv). By the notion of “collective karma,” Jennings seems to mean simply that our 
actions impinge upon others, and upon the world as a whole, in ways that are liable 
to outlast the present finite existence that each of us is undergoing. It is thus not one-
self who will suffer or enjoy the fruits of one’s actions subsequent to death, but those 
“in endless succeeding generations” (p. xxxvii).
More recently, Stephen Batchelor has echoed this thought:
Regardless of what we believe, our actions will reverberate beyond our deaths. Irrespec-
tive of our personal survival, the legacy of our thoughts, words, and deeds will continue 
through the impressions we leave behind in the lives of those we have influenced or 
touched in any way. (Batchelor 1998, p. 38)
Demythologizing approaches such as this are evident not merely among Western 
interpreters of Buddhist and Hindu traditions, but within certain strands of those 
 traditions themselves. The twentieth-century Thai monk-philosopher, Buddhadāsa 
Bhikkhu, is an example of a highly educated practitioner whose reinterpretation of 
his own Theravāda tradition involves “the systematic reduction of metaphysical as-
pects of Buddhist teaching, such as notions of rebirth in heaven or hell, to psycho-
logical conditions” ( Jackson 2003, p. 33). Central to Buddhadāsa’s hermeneutical 
approach is a distinction between two levels of meaning, designated “everyday lan-
guage” (phasa khon) and “Dhamma language” (phasa tham), respectively.18 For 
Buddhadāsa, the task of interpreting ancient Buddhist scripture could be described 
as bringing words back from their metaphysical use and ascribing to them not their 
“everyday” sense in non-Buddhist contexts but their specific significance in the Bud-
dhist teachings (dhamma in Pāli, dharma in Sanskrit). Thus, it is what Buddhadāsa is 
calling the “everyday language” that exhibits the foreground picture or surface gram-
mar, in Wittgenstein’s sense, with “Dhamma language” designating the depth gram-
mar or background meaning.
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“In everyday language,” writes Buddhadāsa, “the word ‘birth’ refers to the phys-
ical entrance into the world from the mother’s womb” (1971, p. 67). “In Dhamma 
language,” meanwhile, “the word refers to the birth of the idea of ‘I’ and ‘me’ any-
time it arises in the mind” (p. 68). What Buddhadāsa means by “the idea of ‘I’ and 
‘me’” is “a mental event arising out of ignorance, craving, and clinging” (Buddhadāsa 
n.d., p. 1). And what this denotes is an instance of self-serving desire or “self- 
centredness” (n.d., p. 17). Thus, although expressed in somewhat different terms, the 
contention here is close to what we saw in Jennings’ interpretation: “rebirth” desig-
nates the recurrence of selfish cravings or desires. The soteriological goal of Bud-
dhism thus becomes the eradication of selfish motivations for action alongside the 
heightening of one’s “awareness” of whatever one is doing.19
A difference between Jennings and Buddhadāsa is that, while Buddhadāsa relies 
heavily on the distinction between an “everyday” or exoteric level of meaning and a 
“Dhammic” or esoteric level, Jennings denies the need for such a distinction and 
proposes that the Buddha himself denied it as well. To support this view, Jennings 
points to a passage in the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta wherein the Buddha, who is ap-
proaching death, declares to his disciple Ānanda that he has “set forth the Dhamma 
without making any distinction of esoteric and exoteric doctrine; there is nothing . . . 
with regard to the teachings that the [Buddha] holds to the last with the closed fist of 
a teacher who keeps some things back.”20 For Jennings, the ethical sense of the Bud-
dha’s teachings does not in fact lie behind a foregrounded pictorial form of words; in 
order to see it one simply has to pay attention to those passages in the Buddhist scrip-
tures that emphasize the absence of a permanent self and to disregard those that 
show signs of a “Hinduizing” influence ( Jennings 1947, pp. lviii–lxxiii). As an exeget-
ical strategy, however, this is circular: certain passages are disregarded on the grounds 
that they are “accretions” exhibiting inconsistencies with the “original core” of the 
Buddha’s teaching; but this “original core” can be identified only insofar as it is 
what remains when the accretions are expunged. This is why some critics of Jennings’ 
thesis have complained that he offers no real “justification for excising passages 
that refer to transmigration and regarding them as later accretions to the doctrine” 
(Burrow 1949, p. 201).
Buddhadāsa’s distinction between two levels of meaning is defended by Roder-
ick Bucknell and Martin Stuart-Fox, who argue for the existence of an “esoteric trans-
mission” of Buddhist teachings stretching back to the Buddha himself and typically 
articulated through a “twilight language” (saṃdhyābhāṣā), “a purposely created 
mode of communication having a concealed meaning” (Bucknell and Stuart-Fox 
1986, pp. 10, 12). Central to the case that Bucknell and Stuart-Fox present is the 
claim that canonical accounts of three forms of knowledge, which the Buddha is 
purported to have attained on the night of his spiritual awakening, can best be inter-
preted as descriptions of meditative practices. Canonical accounts of the first form of 
knowledge describe the Buddha’s recollection of thousands upon thousands of his 
“previous lives”; in each case, the Buddha recalls such details as what his name was, 
which family and social class he belonged to, what experiences he underwent, and 
how the lifetime ended.21 Accounts of the second form of knowledge describe the 
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Buddha’s “godlike vision” that affords him knowledge of how the fortunes of beings 
are related to their previous actions: those who “behaved badly in body, badly in 
speech, badly in thought” were, “[a]t the breaking up of the body after death . . . born 
in hell”; those who “behaved well,” meanwhile, “were born in a happy heaven 
world.”22 The third form of knowledge is described as “the knowledge of the destruc-
tion of the taints”; that is, the knowledge of how one’s mind becomes tainted with 
selfish desires, ignorance, and so forth, and of how to free it from those taints.23
On the face of it, the first two forms of knowledge attained by the Buddha appear 
to conflict with the sort of psychological account of “rebirth” propounded by 
Buddhadāsa and Jennings. If it were merely the recurrence of self-serving desires and 
attitudes that were denoted by “rebirth,” then what sense would there be in the Bud-
dha’s identifying distinct names and biographical information pertaining to each of 
his former lives? Jennings omits the passages in question from his selection of ex-
cerpts from the Pāli Canon;24 Bucknell and Stuart-Fox, on the other hand, reinterpret 
them in psychological terms. “The death of a being,” they write, “is the ceasing of 
[an] image” (1986, p. 88), where “image” is understood “to denote not only visual 
images but also their counterparts in the other modalities . . . includ[ing] mental ver-
balizing” (p. 159); “rebirth . . . is the arising of the next image; and the karma which 
determines that birth is the previous emotional involvement which determines the 
course of the linking process” (p. 88). In the light of this analysis, the Buddha’s recol-
lection of his previous lives is construed as a “retracing” of the sequence of images 
or thoughts further and further back into his early life — but not beyond his biological 
lifespan — and his perception of the karmic relations between previous actions and 
current circumstances is construed as his insight into the emotionally influenced pro-
cess of one image or thought giving rise to the next, and so on.25 The destruction of 
the taints is, first, the destruction of the taint of failing to observe the images and the 
connections between them, and, second, the cessation of “emotional involvement in 
sense objects and images” (1986, p. 89).
Unlike Jennings, both Buddhadāsa and Bucknell and Stuart-Fox are careful not 
to claim that a psychologized conception of rebirth is the only one that could have 
been intended by the Buddha. Buddhadāsa allows that rebirth after death occurs, but 
considers the question of what form that rebirth will take to be a “trivial” one, given 
that as long as “the ‘I’ and the ‘mine’” continue to arise, any future life will be per-
vaded by suffering. The essential task is to eliminate that self-serving impulse 
(Buddhadāsa n.d., pp. 18–19). Bucknell and Stuart-Fox, meanwhile, distinguish be-
tween “physical” (or “macrocosmic”) and “mental” (or “microcosmic”) phenomena, 
and propose that many terms central to Buddhist thought have a “double reference.” 
Saṃsāra, for instance, refers to both an ongoing series of (“physical”) lifetimes, each 
being connected by relations of karmic consequence, and “the stream of thought” 
that is patterned by relations of “emotional involvement” (Bucknell and Stuart-Fox 
1986, pp. 93–94).
One way of reading the latter suggestion would be as a claim that the words at-
tributed to the Buddha are systematically ambiguous between the two levels of 
meaning. Although this is a rather difficult idea to make sense of, it conforms fairly 
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closely to proposals made by other interpreters.26 What Bucknell and Stuart-Fox 
write, however, is that “It is likely . . . that [the Buddha] and his immediate followers 
actually perceived these correspondences as identities. For them the flow of thought 
probably did not merely correspond to saṃsāra, but actually was saṃsāra” (1986, 
p. 93). This speculation is interesting, and may be implying that the concept of 
saṃsāra in early Buddhism is one that cannot be characterized other than by invok-
ing aspects both of the concept of thought and of the concept of life; but the specula-
tion is not sufficiently elaborated to indicate exactly what the authors had in mind. In 
the end, the emphasis of Bucknell and Stuart-Fox’s work is not so much on recover-
ing the original meaning of the teachings, but on “translat[ing]” those teachings into 
an idiom that will “be genuinely intelligible and useful for modern humankind”; 
what they take to be most appropriate for this purpose is “predominantly the idiom 
of psychology” (1989, p. 196).
Psychologization and the Loss of Significance
It is no accident that the attempts to “demythologize” or “psychologize” the concepts 
of karma and rebirth that have been outlined in the preceding section are all con-
cerned primarily with Buddhist rather than Hindu traditions. This is because, al-
though efforts have been made by some Hindus to reconceptualize their traditional 
teachings in the mold of what are perceived to be more “rational” and “scientific” 
modes of thought,27 these efforts have tended not to go as far as those by interpreters 
and followers of Buddhism. Several Hindu intellectuals, seeking to align the doctrine 
of reincarnation with a Darwinian theory of evolution, have downplayed the possi-
bility of “retrogressive reincarnation”; that is, rebirth of a human in animal form.28 
This has sometimes gone hand-in-hand with the introduction of psychological rein-
terpretations of traditional references to human-to-animal rebirth, construing talk of 
“rebirth in animal form” to be “a figure of speech for rebirth with animal qualities” 
(Radhakrishnan 1937, p. 232).29 But these reinterpretations have generally accepted 
that the doctrine does involve a belief in a succession of lifetimes that, although 
physically discrete, are nevertheless spiritually and ethically interwoven.
Among my purposes in this essay has been that of indicating the range of con-
ceptual possibilities available to interpreters of karma and rebirth and of showing 
how the reinterpretive projects of certain scholars of Buddhism in particular implic-
itly echo themes prevalent in Wittgenstein-influenced philosophy. As we have seen, 
in some instances the purported motivation behind the reinterpretation is to recover 
the “original” or “essential” meaning of the doctrine. Jennings is a poignant exemplar 
of this approach, and Dilman’s reading of the Phaedo also presents itself as an expo-
sition of what the text really means rather than merely as one among a number of 
possible readings. Meanwhile, there are other instances in which the motivation is to 
bring the doctrine up to date, to make it intelligible to a modern audience. We have 
seen signs of this motivation in the work of Bucknell and Stuart-Fox, even though 
they are not always explicit on this point. In any event, regardless of the particular 
motivations in play, it is important to notice what is gained but also what is lost in any 
 Mikel Burley 975
reinterpretation. One way of doing this is to reflect upon the reinterpretive strategies 
in the light of the examples with which I began this essay.
In the cases of both the Hindu widow and Ani Pachen, an obvious feature is the 
way in which these women perceive their present suffering as a consequence of their 
own misdeeds performed in a previous life. From the religio-cultural perspective that 
each of them inhabits, it makes sense to think of one’s suffering in this way, to see it 
as a kind of punishment that will have a spiritually purifying effect in the longer term: 
“The pain will eliminate my sins,” as Pachen puts it. Seeing the pain in this way, as 
deserved, brings with it a deep acceptance and a way of articulating that acceptance. 
Evident in Pachen’s response in particular is a willingness to forbear the suffering and 
a hopefulness that there are better times ahead. As another Tibetan woman who was 
dreadfully abused by Chinese officials recalls, a Buddhist lama would try to reassure 
her by saying “Whatever we are passing through . . . is a result of our karma, so we 
must bear it gracefully with faith that truth is its own witness.”30 The pain is some-
thing that must be endured if the better times are to be reached. Thus, when Pachen 
has been tortured so badly that she finds herself longing for death, she pulls herself 
out of that despair with the thought that, were she to die, she “would be reborn with 
the same sins in front of [her].” It is better, she adds, “to suffer and hope for a higher 
rebirth” (2001, p. 219).
Those who do not believe in karma and rebirth will not be able to share these 
thoughts. Wittgenstein, in one of his lectures on religious belief, considers the case 
of someone who, being ill, regards it as a punishment. While admitting that he has 
no such thoughts of punishment in relation to illness, Wittgenstein does not think 
of himself as contradicting the person who does have these thoughts. Rather, the dif-
ference goes deeper: it consists in thinking in a different way, saying different things 
to oneself, “hav[ing] different pictures” (Wittgenstein 1966, p. 55).31 Dilman, in his 
reading of the Phaedo, acknowledges the powerful effect that the idea, the picture, 
of rebirth can have in someone’s life; and by continuing to refer to it as a specifically 
religious picture, Dilman avoids reducing it to something less conceptually rich and 
nuanced than it is. What we see in the various readings of Buddhist conceptions of 
karma and rebirth that we have looked at, however, is the deployment of interpretive 
strategies that erase or obfuscate the dimension of individual responsibility for one’s 
circumstances, thereby shifting the interpretation in a direction that cannot make 
sense of the examples we are considering.
When the Hindu widow speaks of her sins being “gathered near [her],” or Ani 
Pachen speaks of her sins being eliminated by pain, a connection is being made be-
tween sin, suffering, and spiritual purification that is absent from the demythologized 
readings. While it is clearly true that, as Jennings and Batchelor observe, our actions 
(or at least some of them) will have implications that outlast our present lives, this 
thought can hardly account for the feeling of being responsible for the suffering that 
one is now undergoing. Neither can this feeling be accounted for by the idea, de-
rived from Buddhadāsa and embellished by Bucknell and Stuart-Fox, that one’s cur-
rent thoughts and mental images are part of an ongoing series of such thoughts and 
images that are linked together through modes of emotional attachment. No matter 
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how far back in their present lives the Hindu widow and Ani Pachen “retrace” the 
path of their respective thoughts and images, they will not come to a point where 
they discover the cause of their current suffering. Buddhadāsa would be liable to say 
that it is the identification of themselves with an “I” or “me” who suffers that is at the 
root of their experience of suffering, and he would be right to note that Buddhism has 
a long tradition of advocating release from suffering through relinquishing various 
forms of attachment. But such practices of non-attachment do not themselves explain 
the situation in which someone finds herself — the situation of losing one’s husband 
and then one’s eyesight and one’s daughter, or of being tortured in prison.
Of course, non-believers in karma and rebirth may say that these things can be 
perfectly well explained in ways that do not require their being accorded the sort of 
moral and spiritual significance that we see the Hindu widow and Ani Pachen attrib-
uting to them. But that is not the point: if we are to comprehend the meaning of the 
belief in these people’s lives, we have to recognize that they do attribute moral and 
spiritual significance to what others might be inclined to call mere misfortunes. The 
Hindu widow and Ani Pachen find that significance attributable, given the religious 
perspective from which they view the world, and such significance cannot be ac-
counted for in terms of the demythologized or psychologized interpretations that we 
have examined.
Conclusion
Dilman is surely right when he describes talk of reincarnation as expressing “a reli-
gious picture” that “represents a way of thinking about life, a way of sizing up our 
actions within life’s brief span.” This applies to such talk as it occurs not only in 
Plato’s Phaedo but also in the lives of many Hindu and Buddhist believers in karma 
and rebirth. The difficulty is to say something more specific than this, for the idea of 
a “picture” is apt to strike many as vague and evasive, and as failing to address the 
central question of whether the picture is to be taken literally (“metaphysically”) or 
merely figuratively. This kind of response, however, falls into a trap that Wittgenstein 
was trying to save us — or himself — from when he introduced the idea of a picture in 
the first place. To say that the picture is in the foreground and the sense is in the back-
ground is not to imply that the best way of understanding the picture is to remove it 
in order to expose a kind of blueprint or prototype embodying the raw, unadulterated 
“literal” meaning, of which the picture was merely an extravagant adornment.  Rather, 
it is to say that one cannot expect to understand the meaning by looking merely at 
the surface, and neither will one penetrate through to some hidden meaning by star-
ing at the picture on its own. Instead, one has to inquire into the place that it has in 
the lives of those who use it.
While this essay hardly provides a thorough investigation into the lives of be-
lievers in karma and rebirth, it does indicate some ways in which such an investiga-
tion might begin; that is, by observing how the language associated with the belief 
informs the believers’ responses to certain circumstances, especially circumstances 
of suffering or abuse. Many non-believers will find those responses unpalatable; in 
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particular, they may see as morally repulsive the idea of holding oneself responsible 
for the abuse that one receives from someone else. But one does not have to regard 
the belief as attractive in order to come to a richer understanding of it; it is by seeing 
the role of the belief in the hurly-burly of life, which comes through especially viv-
idly in sources such as Ani Pachen’s memoir, that one’s understanding is enriched.
Much of this essay has been concerned with outlining the range of ways in which 
other interpreters have sought to return the language of karma and rebirth from a 
crude metaphysical to a more nuanced sense that is attentive to certain ethical ideals 
and forms of meditative practice. Following some currently common usage, I have 
referred to these as “demythologizing” or “psychologizing” approaches. Without 
 denying that there may be forms of belief in karma and rebirth, either traditional or 
modern, in relation to which these interpretations have stronger purchase, I have in-
dicated some of their peculiarities and noted where they do not apply to the two 
main examples I have considered — examples that are representative of widely held 
modes of belief.32 It does not follow from this that examples could not be found else-
where to which the interpretations apply more closely; nor does it follow that the 
interpretations are illegitimate when construed as proposals for how karma and re-
birth should best be reconceptualized for effective use in the modern world. What 
follows is that there would be a distortion involved in assuming that the interpreta-
tions concerned can be generalized to cover all, or indeed most, forms of belief in 
karma and rebirth; for, in the case of a significant number of believers, these interpre-
tations do not capture the ways in which the language of karma and rebirth operates 
in the stream of thought and life.
Notes
Some of the ideas in this article were tested out in a paper that I presented at a work-
shop on cross-cultural philosophy at Durham University, July 11, 2013. I am grateful 
to participants in that workshop for helpful discussion. Also valuable were comments 
on an earlier draft from two referees for this journal.
1   –   Wittgenstein 1967, sec. 173; cf. Wittgenstein 1982, sec. 913.
2   –   For the idea that the meaning of an utterance is dependent on its “surround-
ings,” see, for example, Wittgenstein 1966, p. 59; 1980a, sec. 129; [1953] 
2009, secs. 412, 540. See also Phillips 1993, p. 72.
3   –   One place where Wittgenstein introduces the idea of a “grammatical” investi-
gation is his [1953] 2009, sec. 90. For discussion, see Canfield 1981, esp. 
pp. 207–211.
4   –   See, for example, Hacker 1999, p. 4; Meredith Williams 1999, p. 1; Kenny 
1968, p. 78.
5   –   To cite just two of many possible examples: a DVD documentary by Mark Ap-
plebaum titled The Metaphysics of Notation was released by Innova Records in 
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2010, and from August to November 2010 the author of a video gaming blog 
called Falling Awkwardly posted a series of four critical discussions of the game 
The Elder Scrolls under the title “The Metaphysics of Morowind.”
6   –   See, for example, “Metaphysics,” in Caygill 1995, p. 291.
7   –   See, for example, Chignell and Dole 2005, where they celebrate “a return to 
traditional discussion of the entities referred to by [religious] language,” with 
God being “conceived as a genuine metaphysical entity” (p. 11; original em-
phasis).
8   –   See, for example, Ayer [1936] 2001, esp. chap. 1. For concise discussion, see 
Martin 1990, pp. 41–43.
9   –   For the term Gewimmel, translated as “hurly-burly,” see Wittgenstein 1967, sec. 
567, and 1980b, sec. 629.
10   –   For critical discussion, see McGhee 1996.
11   –   Cf. Wittgenstein [1953] 2009, pt. 2, iv, sec. 26: “It is not a picture that we 
choose, not a simile, yet it is a graphic expression.”
12   –   See, for example, Archer-Hind 1894, p. xxxi: “The onus probandi, I take it, lies 
with those who do not interpret literally.”
13   –   For discussion, see Shields 2008, pp. 31–32.
14   –   For the “surface grammar”–“depth grammar” distinction, see Wittgenstein 
[1953] 2009, sec. 664.
15   –   A useful analysis of this style of interpretation in relation to Buddhism is offered 
by McMahan 2004 and 2008, esp. pp. 45–59.
16   –   Jennings died in 1941, but his book went unpublished until 1947. His inter-
pretation is partially prefigured by earlier authors; see, for example, Kern 1898, 
esp. pp. 49–50. T. W. Rhys Davids has also been cited as a forerunner (see Bur-
row 1949, p. 201). Jennings’ interpretation was brought to the attention of phi-
losophers of religion largely by John Hick’s interest in it; see Hick 1973, chap. 
8; 1990, chap. 11; 1976, pp. 358–359. Hick may have been the first to apply 
the term “demythologize” to accounts of karma and rebirth.
17   –   “The two bases of the Dhamma are . . . selflessness and helpfulness. The whole 
elaborate metaphysical superstructure, built up later upon this, fades away” 
( Jennings 1947, p. xlii).
18   –   See, for example, Buddhadāsa 1971, chap. 3, and 1974.
19   –   Buddhadāsa n.d., p. 28: “The Buddha’s goal was a life of awareness. . . .” See 
also Swearer’s description of modernizing conceptions of Buddhist teachings, 
which “[demythologize] the tradition in the service of ethical and psychologi-
cal values. Nibbāna, for example, tends to be interpreted primarily as a non-
attached way of being in the world. . . .” (Swearer 1995, p. 157).
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20   –   Mahāparinibbāna Sutta 2012, pt. 2, sec. 32; cf. Jennings 1947, p. xxxviii.
21   –   See Sāmaññaphala Sutta (Dīgha Nikāya 1.81), in Gethin 2008, p. 33.
22   –   Sāmaññaphala Sutta (Dīgha Nikāya 1.82), in Gethin 2008, p. 34.
23   –   Sāmaññaphala Sutta (Dīgha Nikāya 1.84), in Gethin 2008, p. 35.
24   –   See Jennings 1947, p. 27 n. 14.
25   –   For their exposition of “retracing,” see Bucknell and Stuart-Fox 1986, pp. 51–
60. See also Bucknell and Stuart-Fox 1983.
26   –   See, for example, the section headed “Cosmology and psychology: macrocosm 
and microcosm” in Gethin 1998, pp. 119–126, and also Williams, Tribe, and 
Wynne 2012, p. 57.
27   –   One early example was Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay (1838–1894); see 
 Chatterjee 1993, chap. 3.
28   –   See, for example, Abhedananda 1957. Publications of the Theosophical Society 
were significant in promoting the idea of a parallel between the doctrine of rein-
carnation and biological evolution; see, for example, Walker 1923, pp. 13–14.
29   –   See also Nayak 1993, p. 76, and Minor 1986.
30   –   Chompel Gyamtso Rinpoche, quoted in Tapontsang 1997, p. 107.
31   –   For further discussion of this passage in relation to conceptions of karma and 
rebirth, see Burley 2013.
32   –   Although each of the examples upon which I have focused illustrates a specifi-
cally self-directed attitude of responsibility for one’s own suffering, this attitude 
is continuous with the more general conception of the doctrine of karma as 
involving retributive explanations of why ill fortune befalls certain individuals 
and not others. This general conception is evident in numerous sources, in-
cluding: Krishan 1997, pp. xi, 3–4, 44–46, 70–71, 195–196; Sharma 1973; and 
Spiro 1982, esp. p. 136. It is also central to discussions of whether the doctrine 
of karma can contribute toward a response to the “problem of evil” (see, e.g., 
Kaufman 2005).
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